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On markets and the conditions of a profitable use 
of economic instruments for environmental policy 
in countries in transition to market1 
 
Olivier Godard2 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economic instruments are generally advocated by economists 
for their ability to get cost-efficient outcomes when allocating 
scarce resources to environmental protection. Here, cost-
efficiency means that achieving a given environmental target 
can be obtained at least total cost for society. How much is the 
gain, compared to other approaches, is an empirical issue which 
can be answered only by empirical studies: the margin of 
potential gain depends on typical features of each situation in 
which the use of economic instruments is considered. 
 
Such features are related first to some ‘structural’ conditions 
such as information availability, the diversity of technologies in 
use and the scope for new technological opportunities, the 
heterogeneity of costs functions, the shape of environmental 
damage curves, and so on. They are also critically linked to 
characteristics of the prevailing economic organisation: 
definition of property rights (against free access) and liability 
rules, enforcement of the rule of the law, existence of markets 
on which firms do compete or which are open to easy entry of 
competitors (‘contestable markets’), economic decentralisation 
of the choice of means for achieving some environmental 
quality targets (against administrative technological forcing), 
and so on. 
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 The paper has been presented as the introductory report to the UN-
ECE/OECD Workshop on the Role of Economic Instruments in Integrating 
Environmental Policy with Sectoral Policies, held in Prühonice, Czech 
Republic, 8-10 october 1997. 
2
 International Centre for Research on Environment and Development 
(CIRED), Paris, France. 
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In some recent actual cases, it is reported that well-
functioning economic instruments can cut abatement costs by a 
factor of 33. In other cases, the gain may be limited to only 
30%, which may nevertheless leads to important amounts being 
saved when we deal with such economically important sectors 
as water treatment and distribution, or waste management. The 
more environmental policies develop and potentially constrain 
business practices, the more the gains derived from the use of 
economic instruments could be important. So, far from being a 
limited concern reserved for economists as a profession, 
economic efficiency of environmental policies ought to be 
considered a real concern for environmentalists who understand 
that environmental action will only be acceptable by 
populations in the long run if its cost is justified and non-
inflationary, for industrial circles sensitive to competition on 
the marketplace or for local authorities sensitive to budgetary 
and tax constraints. 
 
Meanwhile, analysts are generally aware, even on the basis of 
OECD experience, that a significant gap may exist between 
theoretical analyses of economic instruments' achievements and 
their actual performance in specific empirical cases: the 
practical design of instruments may be far enough from the 
theory in which it is said that inspiration has been taken; a lot 
of additional regulatory constraints may impede a correct 
running of the instrument; the contextual conditions in which 
the instrument is implemented may be at odd with the ones 
fitting well a cost-effective working of the instrument. 
 
For instance, this would be non sense to expect an 
incentive tax to achieve significant environmental improvement 
and cost-minimisation in a situation where markets are hardly 
existing and essential resources are allocated through non-
market procedures. A tax or a charge can be incentive if agents 
having to pay do have alternative ways to behave - it means 
they can make choices - and are sensitive to price stimuli. 
 
On the other hand it would be a rather depressing 
conclusion that economic instruments could only be used when 
a full and perfect market economy is set up. In that case, there 
would be no room for using economic instruments for 
environmental policies at all, either for present OECD countries 
                                                          
3
 This is the case of a recent assessment of the benefits of a flexible 
interutility SO2 allowances trading in the USA in the framework of the Acid 
Rain Program, as compared to a traditional command-and-control approach 
(a uniform emission abatement rate for all facilities). See Burtraw (1996). 
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or countries in transition! In fact, there is a broad scope for an 
intelligent use of economic instruments without waiting the full 
development of a market economy. In intermediate, ‘mixed’, 
models of economic organisation, the issue of incentive 
compatibility of regulatory rules and institutional regimes has a 
critical importance for the cost-effectiveness of policies. In 
most cases incentive compatibility can be significantly 
improved by introducing economic thinking and instruments in 
such regimes. 
 
The purpose of the paper is to provide an introductory 
discussion on the conditions permitting to benefit by economic 
instruments in a context of transition. Rather simple views on 
appropriate use of these instruments will be proposed. They 
will stress the advantages of a global economic restructuring 
towards a market economy for exploiting the efficiency 
potential of these instruments. At the same time, examples from 
OECD experience will show which benefits can be obtained 
from economic instruments even if markets do not function as 
hoped in textbooks, and in which directions some institutional 
settings could profitably evolve. 
 
Section 2 considers theoretical efficiency conditions for 
economic instruments and derives two basic recommendations. 
Section 3 briefly looks back to past experience. Section 4 
underlines why economic instruments may be profitable even 
when a market economy is not fully developed, and introduces 
two examples. Section 5 suggests a simple model of choices of 
policy instruments constrained by institutional trajectories. 
Section 6 considers some issues which may shape the choice of 
policy instruments in economies in transition. Section 7 
provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
 
2. From theoretical conditions of efficiency of  
economic instruments to basic recommendations 
 
Economic instruments have, in many circumstances, a greater 
potential of economic efficiency than traditional Command 
And Control (CAC) approaches. This general conclusion is 
linked to stylised facts and assumptions characterising the 
contexts in which these instruments do their best. They 
correspond to the operation of a ‘nearly perfect’ market 
economy, i.e. a market economy which is ‘perfect’, excepted 
for environmental external effects. We know such ‘perfect 
economy’ does exist nowhere in the world, but it provides a 
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useful benchmark to clarify some critical conditions for the 
good functioning of a developed market economy and to 
identify what improvements should be targeted in the 
economies in transition so as to make a profitable use of 
economic instruments for their environmental policies. 
 
Economic instruments in  
a nearly perfect market economy 
 
Regarding the ideal development of a market economy, the 
following assumptions are particularly significant: 
- property rights on scarce goods are well-defined and 
legally enforced by the rule of the law; in the basic 
model, private property is the dominant form of 
property for all private goods, although some public 
and common property coexist for collective goods; 
each agent is given the opportunity to fully exploit its 
own property rights and, at the same time, strictly 
respects the property rights of others; 
- access to private goods and services is provided on a 
competitive market, for which individual agents are 
‘price-takers’; market prices ensure an equilibrium 
between demand and supply; this equilibrium is 
Pareto-optimal, but contingent to the initial 
distribution of income and property rights; 
- economic agents behave as to maximise an objective-
function - utility in the case of consumers, profit in the 
case of producers -; because of this supposed ability to 
optimise their choices in using scarce resources and 
goods, and willingness to catch advantageous 
opportunities, agents are sensitive to changing 
economic conditions; so, they are responsive to price 
movements; 
- decentralised agents possess the best information on 
the range of technologies available, the nature and 
quality of economic goods and services, and the costs 
and benefits that may be the outcome of their actions; 
business firms, but also public utilities, are supposed 
to be familiar with their own production function and 
their own marginal abatement cost curves for the 
pollution they emit; compulsory accounting 
procedures are facilitating this consciousness in 
providing separate analytical accounts for each 
category of goods produced or consumed; 
O. Godard- Economic instruments    -5- 
- the income or budgetary constraint applies rigorously, 
which is a key departure from the planned socialist 
organisation in which a ‘soft budgetary constraint’ was 
dominating the behaviour of publicly-owned 
production units (Kornai, 1984); 
- though their choices are limited by the income or 
budgetary constraint, some intertemporal flexibility is 
allowed by an undiscriminated access to credit; the 
rate of interest on this credit market provides the 
appropriate equilibrium between supply and demand, 
savings and investment; 
- general state expenditures for guaranteeing basic 
conditions of public order for citizens within a modern 
state (justice, police, defence, education,...) are 
covered by non-distortionary taxes4; the provision of 
specific public goods (a bridge crossing a river...) is 
supposed to be covered by user charges corresponding 
to the marginal willingness to pay of each category of 
users, inasmuch information on willingness to pay is 
not strategically biased and there are no possibility of 
secondary black market; various publicly produced, 
privately consumed services (water or power 
distribution, for instance) are rated according to the 
rule of marginal long run production cost, with a 
constraint of budgetary equilibrium; 
- internalising external effects into the market prices is 
the most straightforward way to take into account 
environmental external damage of production and 
consumption activities. 
In such a stylised context, economic instruments 
(incentive charges, tradable emission permits or tradable 
production quotas, deposit refunds) are appropriate policy 
tools, since they involve the action of a price mechanism and 
are able to capture its efficiency properties. To say it shortly, 
the frequent superiority of economic instruments is to be found 
on the grounds of incentives and information, when 
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 A tax is distortive when it changes the relative incentives to which agents 
are exposed through price mechanisms, then unintendedly affecting choices 
regarding investment, the choices of techniques or consumption bundles; it 
introduces a gap between their actual choices and the ‘first best’ ones they 
prefer when they face with undistorted price signals. For instance, if product 
taxes only respond to raising funds purposes, they are distortive in 
proportion of the price-elasticity of demand of these products. Welfare loss 
resulting from distortionary price signals is often referred to as ‘dead-weight 
loss cost’ of taxes. 
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decentralised agents do behave as market operators. So, two 
central dimensions of economic instruments are of concern for 
the following discussion: 
- they provide economic incentives so as to reconcile 
private and public interest and escape frequent 
tendencies for individuals to try to escape rules that 
impose on them costs or constraints not directly 
responding to self-interest; 
- they allow the full use of private information owned 
by decentralised agents without requiring the transfer 
of this information to central authorities; being 
exposed to the appropriate price signals, decentralised 
agents calculate optimal responses which incorporate 
all technological and economic information they 
possess, for the best benefit to society. 
 
Independently on the level of market extension, some 
features of the real world introduce various sources of 
additional complexity in the model and may change the content 
of recommendations for the use of economic instruments. One 
of these features is uncertainty regarding social abatement costs 
curves or damage costs curves, or both. One another is related 
to technological progress. Main features are synthesised 
thereafter in the Figure 1 which details the influence of several 
variables on the best policy instrument. 
 
Two derived basic recommendations 
The mentioned theoretical economic construct is useful for 
understanding the general conditions of an efficient action of 
price mechanisms. Two main recommendations can be derived: 
 
(1) achieving a definition of property rights as 
complete as possible: In every case, property rights are 
essential because, by making access regulated and 
conditional to a counterpart, they lay the ground for a 
rational, intertemporal management of resources. 
Defining property rights does not necessarily mean 
private property. International experience demonstrates 
the great variety of forms of property rights and 
conditions for cost-effective management of natural 
resources. Along with private property, there exists 
quite traditional public property and also common 
property (Ostrom, 1990). The so-called ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ is only a ‘tragedy of free access’. 
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Figure 1 : Variables affecting the choice between 
regulation and economic instruments 
(from Godard and Beaumais, 1994, p. 155) 
 
INFLUENCE IN FAVOUR OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
REGULATION  
IN FAVOUR OF 
ECONOMIC 
INSTRUMENTS  
CIRCUMSTANCES   
Nature of the problem  Definition of a common 
convention or goal 
Allocation of a scarce 
resource 
Number of agents concerned 
by an allocation problem Small Large 
Access to information  Common, or public 
knowledge 
Asymmetric and strategic 
Shape of marginal damage 
cost curve compared to 
marginal abatement cost 
curve, under uncertainty 
Deeper slope, or critical 
thresholds  
Flat slope 
Diversity of costs and 
opportunities across 
decentralised agents  
Low High 
Potential to be expected 
from technological 
innovation  
Low High 
Potential to be expected 
from technological 
standardization 
High Low 
 
How to read the figure is illustrated by the two arrows. 
Examples: (1) where the circumstance "nature of the problem" 
is in the position "definition of a common convention or 
goal", this favours the choice of administrative regulation;  
(2) where the circumstance "potential to be expected from 
technological innovation " is in the position "low", to some 
extent this also favours the choice of administrative 
regulation. An example is actions of conservation of natural 
spaces based on zoning and various restrictions upon usage 
and productive activities; limited to specific parts of the 
territory, such measures will not have major negative impacts 
on innovation. The situation is very different with control 
policies targeting industrial pollution. 
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For instance, if there are some concern about the use of 
groundwater and there is no regulation and property 
rights to define the conditions of access to this water, 
there is no base for an introduction of an economic 
mechanism, be they charges or tradable water rights; 
setting rules, rights and meters are a prerequisite of the 
play of any economic mechanism. 
It is important that the definition of property rights is 
done as completely as possible in order to avoid leakage 
side-effects that will disrupt efficiency features of 
economic instruments. Partial settings may do no good. 
For instance, what about taxing commercial energy 
sources for their external effects (acid pollution, CO2, 
...), if agents may also have access to unregulated non-
commercial sources whose extraction or use is depleting 
the environment? In such a case, the more the 
commercial source is taxed, the more the environment is 
disrupted through the leakage and bias in incentives. 
(2)  defining incentives that are appropriate to target 
groups (Nichols,1984): using incentive economic 
instruments may be a powerful instrument when target 
agents are sensitive and responsive to price signals. If, 
for whatever motives, the demand for goods or the use 
of natural resources is price-inelastic, economic 
instruments come to function only as taxes for raising 
revenues. For instance, if access to water services is 
priced and people who have to pay have got no 
alternative choices for changing their consumption 
patterns, due to the poor content of control variables 
they have in their hands (do they physically control their 
own consumption? have they access to alternative 
technologies?), this payment may be essential for 
financial motives but plays no economic role. Using 
economic instruments has to be seen as part of an 
integrated approach that, in parallel, aims at opening the 
scope of real alternatives to which agents have access. 
This diversity in means is supposed to be broadly 
brought by the development of a market economy. 
However it also depends, for public goods, on 
appropriate investments in, and organisation of public 
services. 
 
When the price sensitivity and responsiveness is not developed, 
it may preferable to renounce, not to a strategic thinking in 
terms of incentives, but specifically to instruments directly 
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exploiting price mechanisms. Where decision-makers are 
sensitive to public opinion attitudes, devoting resources to a 
public information on environmental and cost performances of 
various entities (firms, local authorities, agencies) may be an 
interesting way to incite everybody to achieve a better 
environmental management. In other contexts, changing 
criteria for career advancement or adding some new personal 
bonus for good environmental management, may awake 
attention of managers often absorbed by other problems or 
taken within inappropriate routines. Another example is the 
specific role of committees and commissions in which 
members come from various horizons and represent different 
stakeholders: bringing regular flows of information, and 
possibly putting into question the reputation of such and such 
group or firm, may be an adequate incentive to vigilance5. Such 
a thinking may be very useful for defining a strategy of 
implementation of environmental policy targeting public sector 
activities, if they are still less responsive to price signals. 
 
3. A brief comparative outlook on past experience 
Much has been said on the reasons why planned, socialist 
economies have hurt so badly the environment in the past and 
demonstrated such a poor performance in environmental 
management6. Some are linked to structural choices (primacy 
for heavy industry and intensive use of dirty energy sources; 
under-development of so-called non productive activities). But 
others are related to incentives failures of the socialist 
economic organisation and institutions: disregard of the 
demand side, a focus on physical quantitative indicators of 
output, a lack of incentives for technological progress, a 
bureaucratic allocation of resources and funds, no pricing for 
the use of natural resources and functions, a low level of cross-
sectoral integration, ‘soft budgetary constraints’, poor and 
distorted statistical information, a low implementation of the 
rule of the law, turned into an arbitrary and discretionary tool in 
the hands of a political bureaucracy (Goldman, 1985, Godard, 
1991). 
                                                          
5
 In the French case, the often quoted case of Water Basin Commissions, 
said to be sort of ‘Water Parliament’, is reported to achieve some efficiency 
by this exposure of each group to the look of others: no one likes to be 
denounced as a bad ‘water citizen’ due to its pollution! In that case, other 
aspects do matter too, with a complex mix: emissions and technological 
standards, subsidies received for investment programmes in pollution 
control and treatment, and, paradoxically not the most important aspect, the 
charges paid by polluters. 
6
 See a review in Godard (1991, 1994). 
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To some extent, the more recent history of some 
countries in transition such as Poland or Czechoslovakia also 
demonstrated a paradox: since the mid-seventies, they have 
committed themselves to an early introduction of some price 
instruments (charges for water resources, fines and penalties for 
non compliance, liability regimes for environmental damage) in 
an economic system which was not yet mainly driven by 
market price mechanisms; this early use has not proved to be 
successful, both on environmental and economic grounds 
(Godard, 1991; Zylicz, 1994). 
 
Interesting paradoxical points can also be derived from 
the experience of OECD countries. In spite of early advocacy 
by economists and organisations as OECD, environmental 
policies have been mainly founded on administrative 
approaches (permit systems) and regulatory instruments based 
on various types of standards and corresponding concepts 
(BATNEEC7, for instance), which are currently characterised 
as CAC. In many cases, this CAC approach has been 
supplemented by financial tools (earmarked charges) so as to 
raise resources for financing investment programs for sewage 
treatment or pollution prevention. The recent growth in the use 
of economic instruments (Barde 1997) and ‘third generation’ 
instruments (dialogue, consultation, persuasion, covenants, 
voluntary agreements) (Dente, 1995) has not replaced that 
foundation, but supplemented it. 
 
These facts can be interpreted as saying: 
 
1. administrative, regulatory and law tools, by themselves, 
generally are not sufficient to achieve the enforcement 
of environmental targets recognised by the law; this 
may be seen as a social weakness of the rule of the law 
for environmental matters; 
2. to be enforced, they need the support of appropriate 
financial and economic mechanisms, reducing the 
incentive gap for decentralised agents and bringing the 
means to invest in pollution control; 
3. 
on the top of these tools, some specific scenes for 
exchange of information, deliberation, shaping common 
visions of issues and identifying common interests 
among main stakeholders, are often required to set the 
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 BATNEEC stands for Best Available Technologies Not Entailing 
Excessive Costs. 
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policy directions and build the broad social acceptance 
of environmental policies. 
 
So, a new frontier for policy instruments lies less in a 
further expansion of ‘pure’ economic instruments than in an 
improvement of ‘mixed approaches’. How the three types of 
instruments do interact and can be put on a learning trajectory 
leading to an improved economic efficiency is the key 
question. For instance, can we avoid that consultation and 
dialogue lead to erode incentives and economic efficiency? 
Through which procedures of concerted actions could actors 
who take part to the definition of a regulatory regime be 
interested in choosing economic instruments for solving the 
problems they perceive? 
 
4. On an efficient use of economic instruments in 
imperfectly developed, but improving, market economy 
 
From section 2 it could be concluded that economic 
instruments should be reserved to fully developed economy. In 
fact, it is not necessary that the practical running of an 
economic instrument exactly corresponds to the pure 
theoretical market scheme to be a source of economic gains. 
Those instruments may be productive well before reaching a 
full development of a market economy. Several features are of 
interest: 
 
(1) Economic instruments tend to reveal information about 
abatement costs, obstacles and rigidities. This 
information is gained by observing the reactions of 
agents to the incentives supplied, since such instruments 
are not forcing behaviours and technological choices. 
This learning dimension is very important in practical 
contexts, where assessments of abatement costs and 
potentials are often very uncertain. It allows further 
adaptation of policies, adjustments of expectations 
about possibilities and priorities of action, and finally 
stimulate better-thought projects and regulatory action. 
 
(2) They preserve the flexibility and decentralisation of 
responses. So, they can avoid important mistakes and 
misallocations that could derive from an administrative 
forcing of technologies, for instance through imported 
stringent emissions standards, when the latter are based 
on wrong expectations about domestic costs and 
potentials. Bad information and wrong expectations are 
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more frequent than generally recognised: the history of 
regulation is full of surprises! Moreover, the flexibility 
of economic instruments allows the environmental 
policy to benefit by the general progress of the economy 
towards more flexibility and efficiency, while a CAC 
approach would not catch these opportunities. So 
economic instruments may be profitable, even when 
they are not so much efficient by themselves, but by 
avoiding other types of instruments that could induce 
unnecessarily high economic costs due to information 
deficiencies or limitations.  
 
(3) They can be profitable through their side-effects, or 
institutional opportunities they offer for building new 
settings responding to environmental and non-
environmental objectives of society. Some of them are 
sometimes called « double dividend ». 
 
Two exemplary cases deserve special attention since 
they demonstrate the potentials of these efficiency gains and 
other benefits that environmental economic instruments may 
bring to economies in transition. The first one shows the gains 
resulting from the coupling of two mentioned aspects: avoiding 
the costs of a bad-informed CAC; allowing to benefit by the 
economic changes towards more market flexibility. It is 
provided by the first phase of implementation of the Acid Rain 
SO2 allowances trading programme in the United States. The 
second case is related to the use of charges and taxes, or 
auctioned tradable permits for achieving more comprehensive 
tax reforms. The current plea for an extension of ecotaxes 
(OECD, 1996, 1997) is based on a strategic thinking trying to 
link several types of improvements, for instance both 
environmental improvements and economic ones could be 
aimed at through the incorporation of ecotaxes and the 
reduction of fiscal distortions. 
 
The US SO2 allowances trading programme 
Since the mid-seventies, the U.S. have experimented 
various solutions to give some flexibility to a rigid CAC 
environmental policy: ‘bubbles’, ‘netting’, ‘offset’, ‘banking’. 
All these instruments have been linked to the concept of 
‘tradable’ or ‘marketable’ permits, although most achievements 
did not involve any market or transaction with other economic 
agents, only arrangements between the administration and a 
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firm having one or several regulated facilities (Hahn and 
Hester, 1989). 
 
A new turn has been taken with the 1990 reform of the 
Clean Air Act. Title IV includes the rules for developing a 
country-wide SO2 allowances market for abating total 
emissions of power utilities by 50% of their 1980 level. Phase 1 
of the programme formally8 began on January 1995, but 
allowances transactions happened before, the first publicised 
one being a 10.000 units trade made in May 1992 between the 
Tennessee Valley Authority and the Wisconsin Power & Light 
for a unit price said to be in the range of $250-300. 
 
What have we learned about abatement costs? Whereas 
prices of SO2 allowances have been expected to go beyond 
$10009 and all the public debate during the 80s was animated 
by the view of very high costs, transactions achieved during the 
first years have been made at a much lower price than expected 
($130 in average and as low as $70 in 1996) (Conrad and 
Kohn, 1996). At the same time, transactions volume has been 
rather low until 199510,only 9% of utilities having taken the 
opportunity to trade (Rico, 1995). Is it a success or a failure for 
a market-based instrument? Not yet a success, according to 
what we imagine to be a fully developed market of allowances, 
but certainly a success if we consider economies in cost that 
this programme has already allowed: the implementation cost 
will be between one third or one half that it would have been 
with CAC, says Burtraw (1996). Key features are the 
following: 
 
- CAC would have imposed scrubbers on every big power 
facility; market of scrubbers would have been a captive one 
and the cost would have remained rather high. Since utilities 
were not constrained by the Acid Rain Programme to adopt 
scrubbers, but allowed to consider alternatives, as fuel 
switching and blending with low sulfur coal, scrubbers 
producers have been driven by competition to innovate and 
find ways to cut the cost of the equipment they sell per ton 
of SO2 saved (improvement in design, decrease of 
                                                          
8
 It means that a binding cap on SO2 was implemented from this date. 
9
 Before 1989, industry was saying that the marginal cost would be around 
$1500/tonne of SO2 and was opposing the programme on this basis. 
10
 In fact a take-off of the volume of transactions happened since 1995. 
Whereas transactions were limited under 2 million allowances during the 
April 1994-March 1995 period, they reached more than 5 million the next 
year and nearly 6 million in the April 1996-March 1997 period. 
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maintenance cost and increase of utilisation rate). In five 
years the overall cost of scrubbers has been halved. So, even 
with a low volume of transactions, tradable permits can be a 
powerful instrument for stimulating more cost-efficient 
solutions. 
 
- In the same period, deregulation of railways has been 
achieved, provoking a drop in railway rates and allowing 
access to a much cheaper low-sulphur coal from the West. 
Such an increase of economic flexibility and competition 
outside the sector under consideration for the policy 
instrument (SO2 emissions of power generation) has had a 
tremendous effect in cutting abatement costs. A CAC 
technological forcing would not have been able to catch this 
economic opportunity and would have maintained high 
abatement costs on utilities.  
 
 
Environmental taxes and green tax reforms 
For a specialist of fiscal matters, a perfect tax system is 
one which raises stable and predictable resources for the state 
with no distortions of economic behaviours. For an 
environmental economist, a perfect tax system is one which 
achieves perfect internalisation of external environmental costs 
by adding to the price system a whole set of incentives taxes. 
Until now, neither of them have been successful in achieving 
their ideals: actual tax systems are full of devices generating 
inefficiencies and distortions and incentives taxes for 
internalising external effects are scarce. Although both experts 
have difficulties to reconcile their views, the latter could be 
joined with profit so as to incorporate environmental or ‘green’ 
taxes in the general tax system (OECD, 1997). ‘Double 
dividend’ may have an empirical content inasmuch the actual 
tax system and environmental policies show sources of 
inefficiency and distortions. This is a matter of controversy 
among experts, since an assessment of potential benefits 
depend on judgements on the extent of present imperfections in 
economic organisation, whereas most economic models 
assume, for methodological reasons, either perfect competition 
on every market (top-down models) or needs-and-technology-
driven behaviours (bottom-up models). Such models do not 
easily integrate existing price distortions, dynamic effects on 
technical progress, secondary environmental benefits and are 
not so reliable in testing various revenue recycling strategies 
(see Ekins, 1995). 
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In spite of controversies about ‘double dividend’, 
Sweden introduced in 1991 a large, budget neutral, fiscal 
reform touching 6% of GNP. It had several aims: greening the 
tax system, transferring income tax, which had reached very 
high levels, to VAT and environmental taxes. New 
environmental taxes include a CO2 tax, a SO2 tax, a differential 
tax on leaded and unleaded gasoline, and a NOx tax for power 
generation. The CO2 tax was intended in 1992 to generate a 
little over $2 billion a year in revenue. After various 
adjustments, a little less has been obtained in 1993-1994, 
representing 30% of the total amount of energy and carbon 
taxes (OECD, 1996). 
 
Such an approach has been much debated11, without 
practical results until now, in the context of the international 
action for controlling climatic risks of global warming: a rather 
high carbon tax, phased in during several years in a predictable 
way, could allow both to contain CO2 emissions and bring the 
means to reduce or cut other taxes and charges having 
distortionary effects. Particular attention is given on the 
unwanted side-effects of having placed for decades the social 
security burden on labour: they have contributed to generate 
massive unemployment in the EU, through a distortion of 
technological choices and types of technological progress in 
production, oriented to be labour-saving. Economies in 
transition could take the opportunity of structural reforms for 
putting the burden of social security partially on ‘bads’ such 
environmental pollution and carbon emissions, rather than 
‘goods’ such as employment, which is contributing at a macro 
level to the social equilibrium and equity of society. 
 
5. A simple model for understanding choices of instruments 
constrained by institutional trajectories 
 
Economic instruments may bring economic efficiency in 
environmental policies not only when a market economy is 
fully developed, but also, in the context of transition, when 
sufficient conditions are met regarding the definition of 
property rights, implementation of the rule of the law, and a 
minimum diversity of supply of goods and services, providing 
a scope for choices to agents. So far, so good, but why 
economic instruments have not been more intensively used up 
                                                          
11
 In 1992, the European Commission unsuccessfully proposed to other 
OECD countries to adopt a combined energy and carbon tax. The European 
debate is documented by A. Liberatore (1995). 
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to now? The concept of ‘institutional trajectories’ may give 
some light to this regard (Godard, 1995). This concept is 
linking the margin for change in the choice of policy 
instruments to the previous, inherited features of the regulatory 
regime. Due to the pre-existing ‘investment in forms’12 in the 
regulatory regime, which generally have been costly to set up, 
it is not an easy endeavour to change a whole regime. To be 
introduced, change should be perceived as a strong necessity or 
as a way to capture very significant benefits. So institutional 
innovation will mainly be achieved steps by steps from existing 
rules and devices, making overall compatibility with the 
existing framework an important issue. 
 
Several attempts to introduce economic instruments 
(incentive charges, tradable permits) have failed in the past due 
to the lack of fitness to the existing legal or institutional 
background: it has been the case of differentiated charges 
according to the ecological sensitivity to pollutant discharges 
(Poland), or of new bases for taking charges (France) to take 
examples. The same way, in some countries, the development 
of tradable permits could be blocked by a strict interpretation of 
a basic principle of Administrative Law, that administrative 
permits are ‘non-transferable’. 
 
A rather simple, but radical for economists, conclusion 
results: the main issue of actual policy changes are not 
generally about economic efficiency, but about problem-
solving and law compatibility. In uncertain and controversial 
universes (Godard, 1997), the very definition of the problem to 
solve is an issue of arbitration/compromise-seeking between 
alternative visions of priorities in the policy process. In that 
process, problem-building is directly related to the concerns 
and purposes of social actors, not directly to some objective, 
extra-social definition of environmental issues, as illustrated by 
debates on such issues as drinking water standards or global 
climate change hedging strategies. 
                                                          
12
 The concept of ‘investment in forms’ embraces types of investments 
required to establish and maintain new forms of organisations and 
conventions, implying the constitution and stabilisation of networks of 
actors whose behaviour has to be coordinated. Examples are the 
development of new accounting procedures (green accounting, life-cycle 
analyses, ...), framework for collective negotiations (Water Basin 
Commissions) or international regimes (climate change and the Rio 
convention). In the context of economies in transition, a whole set of new 
institutions have to be further developed regarding property rights, liability 
rules, statistics and data on the state of the environment and environmental 
expenditures, financial circuits and so on. 
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For the choice of policy instruments, this means that 
economic efficiency as such does not matter for most actors as 
the first priority, even if some of them use this rhetoric to 
achieve their aims (for instance, budget reductions aimed at by 
the Ministry of finance). For an institutional trajectory to lead 
to the use of cost-effective instruments, it has generally to 
provide other properties appreciated by social actors in a 
problem-solving context. Economists interested in the 
development of such instruments have to demonstrate the 
ability of these instruments to solve main problems perceived 
by actors and fit the major components of the institutional 
context. 
 
So a rather simple model of ‘institutional trajectories’ 
and instrument adoption for public policies can be derived to 
understand the conditions of policy changes: 
 
1. The existing regulatory regime should prove incapable of 
tackling problems generated by its functioning, or coming 
from a change in the larger economic or political 
environment. 
 
2. Key actors of the existing system should have the feeling of 
suffering, now or in the near future, from the unresolved 
problems.  
 
3. They should develop a clear conviction that it will be 
impossible to solve these problems within the existing 
regulatory regime.  
 
4. They should be gained to the conviction that a specific 
change or new instrument will be able to solve the problems, 
because of its specific properties.  
 
5. A critical coalition of actors sharing the same conviction 
about the necessity of change and the virtues of a new 
instrument should emerge and become an active spokesman in 
favour of the instrument.  
 
6. The coalition in favour of the envisaged change should 
succeed in avoiding the formation of an opposite coalition 
able to block the process.  
 
7. The proposed change and the profile of the new instrument 
should be in approximate accordance with the general 
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ideological and institutional movement of the society, here 
towards a market economy, but also in accordance to more 
specific stakes.  
 
So considering economies in transition, the potential of 
development of economic instruments is linked to the ease with 
which such instruments could contribute to solve problems 
linked to what are perceived as major stakes. 
 
6. Key stakes for the choice of policy instruments  
in Central and Eastern European countries  
in transition to market 
 
Main policy instruments have both advantages and drawbacks 
in a context of transition to market. The full development of 
market-based instruments is too early, due to the general level 
of development of market mechanisms and organisation in 
these economies. At the same time, sticking to traditional CAC 
and ignoring economic instruments would be a factor of 
paralysis and delay in the process of modernisation of public 
policies and could induce unnecessarily high costs. Such a 
landscape attributes no absolute evident superiority to any 
given solution. In order to identify the chances for a reasonable 
incorporation or further development of some economic 
instruments, it is necessary to take into account key stakes 
structuring the present move of economies in transition. Letting 
aside critical, but general issues as income growth, employment 
and social security, or payment of wages of civil servants and 
pensions of elder, it seems that the following points deserve 
specific attention (Godard, 1995). 
 
Territorial decentralisation 
 
Transition to a market economy has been associated with a 
strong demand for keeping more resources and political power 
at regional and local levels, against central states largely 
associated with the failure of previous socialist regimes. The 
ability for these territorial authorities to decide about raising 
taxes and managing funds appear to be a critical issue of the 
period. Environmental taxes and charges may gain political 
attraction to this regard. However, if such instruments were 
intended to support mainly central mechanisms (financing 
general budget of the country, or specific national funds), they 
would provoke reactions of dissent. At the same time, an 
extension of the tax power of regions and local authorities, or 
emergence of a quasi-tax power for non-elected bodies 
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(agencies), or a territorial differentiation of tax rates could raise 
significant problems of law compatibility. 
 
Privatisation 
 
Privatisation of economic activities is a central piece of the 
transition to market. It has been achieved to various extents in 
countries in transition. This step can be taken as an opportunity 
to clarify or enrich entitlements13 regarding access to resources 
(ground or surface water, for instance) and liability rules 
regarding technological risks, accumulated contaminants, or 
emission of pollutants. This stage could be seen as an 
opportunity to develop new market approaches such as 
insurance mechanisms or tradable permits. Generally speaking, 
since private firms are more sensitive to financial incentives 
than public bodies, extension of the private sector could 
profitably be supplemented by an increasing role given to price 
instruments for environmental policies. 
 
In order to achieve a deeper integration of 
environmental policies in different sectors (industry, 
agriculture, transportation, energy usage, local services) a 
whole set of environmental taxes could be considered: air 
emission charges, energy taxes, mineral oil tax, waste deposit 
charges, packaging charges, basic chemicals charges, various 
water charges, and even land-use charges. A good management 
of all these taxes would require a solid fiscal administration 
with accepted and well-developed means for measuring actual 
flows or outright estimations based on technological 
classifications, tracking payments and checking accounts. 
 
Meanwhile, privatisation generates new groups of 
interests and new lobbies wanting to exploit any opportunity to 
take advantage of an actual market economy by internalising 
benefits and externalising social costs (Kapp, 1950). An 
extension of ecotaxes will presumably be ferociously resisted 
by private business in these countries as in most OECD 
countries. Strategically, a key issue is to think about green tax 
reforms which may gain the neutrality or the support of 
significant part of business circles (for example those labour-
intensive activities benefiting by a cut in labour charges). 
 
                                                          
13
 "An entitlement is a socially recognized and sanctioned set of 
expectations on the part of everyone in a society with regard to de jure or de 
facto legal relations that define the choice sets of individuals with respect to 
the choice sets of others" (Bromley, 1989, p. 42). 
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Several countries in transition have a rather long 
experience of charges as an instrument of environmental 
policies. Privatisation give them the opportunity to increase the 
environmental and economic efficiency of such devices. Their 
past inefficiency should be no reason to dismantle them at the 
very moment they could begin to be economically appropriate 
to their implementation context. 
 
Charges in use were generally intended primarily to 
raise funds and secondarily to deliver some incentives in favour 
of implementation of environmental regulations. Western 
experience shows that charges regimes can be initially 
introduced on the basis of earmarking to facilitate their 
acceptability by polluters and local authorities in providing 
them opportunities to get back financial support for their own 
environmental programmes. Then, with time, when the regime 
is incorporated in collective routines, earmarked charges could 
evolve towards more incentive tools with higher rates14 and a 
part of collected funds being directed to general budget at the 
regional or national level15, according to the concept of ‘green 
tax reform’ previously evoked. Meanwhile, since nearly 
nowhere in OECD countries are such taxes at work16, aiming at 
pure incentives taxes cannot be a realistic target for economies 
in transition. It would impose a very high level of takings on 
firms, except if recycling of taxation is organised so as to give 
back revenues to the community of polluters paying the tax, in 
                                                          
14
 For instance, Germany introduced water charges in 1981 at a rate of 
DM12 per pollutant unit and increased the rate to DM70 in 1997. Resources 
raised go the budget of Länder, where they cannot be used freely but only 
for water-related expenditures. Polluters having adopted the Best Available 
Technology can have reductions; the costs of investment in pollution-
control equipment can also be offset by charges reductions (Smith, 1995, 
pp. 25-31). 
15
 T. Zylicz (1994) rightly points that at the present stage of development of 
countries in transition (he considers the case of Poland), there is no case for 
wanting to implement pure incentive taxes, for instance on water pollution, 
which would go to the general budget: (1) to be incentive, the required rate 
would be much too high, by several orders of magnitude, and unbearable by 
firms; (2) there is a need to secure specific financial resources for 
environmental programs against the threat of a capture by the dramatic 
needs of the general budget. 
16
 One of the nearest examples to a Pigouvian tax may be the Swedish 
charge on NOx emitted by power generation facilities: the charge basis is 
actual emissions, and the rate is very high (4700 Ecus/tonne of NO2); 
resources raised are redistributed to facilities according to their energy 
production (OECD, 1994, 1996). However, this is not a pure Pigouvian tax 
since the rate has not been calculated as the marginal damage cost of 
emissions at the optimum but as a means to achieve a given abatement in 
view of accelerated enforcement of more stringent emission standards. 
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order to neutralise revenue transfers. The latter could be 
politically possible only when there is a neutral and objective 
criterion of recycling which can be judged fair by all firms. 
 
An alternative approach, said by some observers 
(Zylicz, 1994) to be more adapted to economies in transition, 
would be to trust tradable permits for achieving a cost-effective 
allocation. At the same time, the needs of precise 
administrative monitoring of emissions for a good running of 
tradable permits should not be underestimated. Its is often said 
by US observers that trading schemes can only be envisaged 
where there is a solid administrative experience in monitoring 
industrial pollution. 
 
Deficiencies of the rule of the law and corruption 
 
Whatever the choice of policy instruments, their 
implementation depends on a general respect of the rule of the 
law and property rights. This may be a critical condition for 
environmental policies in economies in transition due to the 
law and political instability of the period and the many 
weaknesses of state administration regarding skills, information 
and material means. Experience of some OECD countries has 
demonstrated that implementation gaps could be more 
important in the field of environmental law than in other, more 
traditional fields of public responsibility: for instance, 
agriculture often benefits by special environmental rules and 
until very recently was not submitted to the polluter-pays 
principle; in some cases, industry efficiently puts forward 
competitiveness and employment arguments for justifying non-
compliance; local public authorities may also not comply, but 
stress their dependence on local opinion and constraints of 
social acceptance of tax and new treatment facilities for 
explaining why they do not take all appropriate means for 
improving compliance... There is no reason why it should go 
differently in economies in transition. 
 
To the extent there is some objective room for 
corruption of civil servants (very low wages, lack of 
hierarchical supervision, uncertain implementation of the rule 
of the law...), a preference should be given to instruments, the 
implementation of which depends less on discretionary 
decisions of administrative services and more on instruments 
having an automatic action. Tradable permits are an example of 
this sort, once an appropriate rule has been defined for the 
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initial allocation of permits17. Another point would be to avoid 
the concentration of all public functions (data collection, 
definition of technological standards, collecting taxes and 
charges, deciding on the allocation of subsidies, monitoring and 
supervision) in one unique public body, a multivalent agency 
for example. Another general idea is to organise relationships 
so as to introduce third parties in bilateral relations and to 
stimulate public release of information. 
 
Relationships with the European Union and foreign investment 
 
Since the turn to market economy, countries in transition have 
place important hopes in flows of foreign investment and 
international support. Two dimensions can be underscored: 
 
(1) In order to attract foreign investment, countries in transition 
may be tempted to offer special conditions regarding 
environmental issues, e.g. dispensations of regulatory 
measures or of payment of charges for the use of natural 
resources. If it were the case, environmental quality would be 
the prior victim of foreign investment, and distortion in 
competition would be introduced, unduly inducing a 
misallocation of economic resources. Submitting foreign and 
domestic business to the same common law is a requirement 
of fairness and economic efficiency at the same time. 
 
(2) Countries in transition are also led to consider with more 
attention some topics for which there is an international 
concern (global warming, threats on biodiversity, North Sea 
and Baltic, ...) even if they differ from the national agenda of 
priorities. They are also led to consider the use of policy 
instruments similar to those adopted in leading OECD 
countries or the EU-type of approach for environmental 
regulation. Such conventional transfers of issues and 
instruments may not be the most economically appropriate 
one to national or regional contexts. Resistance to pure 
imitation should certainly be recommended, which would 
leave important room for an appropriate use of economic 
mechanisms. At the same time, needs for international 
coordination as well about regional and global issues as for 
domestic policy ones18 should not be disregarded: constraints 
                                                          
17
 This distribution may be an occasion of much lobbying and discretionary 
devolution if this stage is not organised in reference to tough rules. But who 
wants tough rules? 
18
 Several countries in transition ambition to be members of the EU in the 
medium term. Adopting environmental regulation fitting the EU framework 
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may be overcompensated by advantages. For instance, if some 
international carbon permit trading scheme is eventually 
decided on at the Kyoto Conference of December 1997 in the 
framework of the Climate Convention, this may provide 
interesting opportunities for pushing further demand-side 
management and other energy efficiency policies in Eastern 
economies in transition.  
 
Cleaning up inherited pollution, an issue in liability 
 
The ecological heritage of socialism is heavy. This poses both 
an economic problem and a law one: the first is about the cost 
of cleaning-up and the second about who should bear it, since 
property has been radically transformed, often without legal 
continuity. Whoever is elected to be liable for, defining liability 
rules is a most urgent achievement since we know19 the worst 
situation is one with clear liability rule: it leads to a paralysis 
without way out for solving the problems. Specifically, such a 
definition is necessary for obtaining that insurance companies 
accept to cover the risks, otherwise not computable. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
 
Economic instruments for environmental policies could reach 
their full potential of efficiency in economies in which all 
commodities are exchanged on competitive markets and agents 
are maximising operators, ready for catching any market 
opportunity and sensitive to price signals. This ideal cannot be 
held as a realistic picture neither of OECD countries nor 
economies in transition to market, even if market mechanisms 
have gained, to a different degree, a considerable influence on 
their economic life. As far as environmental issues are 
concerned, contexts of action are of mixed-economies type, 
with an important role given to public regulation and public or 
collective financial circuits for environmental programmes. 
Happily, well designed economic instruments can do quite well 
                                                                                                                           
becomes a necessary condition for the success of this ambition. 
Paradoxically, this may be an impediment to the development of the use of 
economic instruments, insofar the EU approach has been structured by a 
CAC approach and various types of standards, for several reasons including 
the fact that most EU member states do not want to see the EU gaining 
competencies in tax matters. Alternatively, the constraints on the way to 
design a SO2 allowances trading scheme in Europe are discussed, with some 
possible solutions, in Cros and Godard (1997). 
19
 This has been systematised as part of the argument surrounding the Coase 
theorem: an efficient allocation achieved by the means of exchange needs a 
non ambiguous initial distribution of property rights and liability. 
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for improving the cost-effectiveness of such policy contexts 
without waiting a full development of a market economy. This 
gains may be derived directly (positive incentives to minimise 
abatement costs), or by opportunity (alleviating technological 
and administrative rigidities). They can also result from 
reforms and new institutional settings they make possible 
(‘green tax reform’, or setting up water communities) on top of 
their direct incentive dimension. 
 
These results can be obtained provided that: 
 
(1) property rights are defined and secured so as agents are 
price-sensitive, without significant leakage by free access 
to substitutes, and can rationally behave and invest 
according to secured rights, 
 
(2) supply of goods and services (technology) is sufficiently 
diverse for agents to be able to have real options of 
choices,  
 
(3) the general evolution of the economy is towards more 
market influence, including privatisation of productive 
activities having no reason to be maintained as public 
monopolies, some deregulation of economic activities, an 
extension of insurance business;  
 
(4) there exist strong, well-informed and reliable 
administrative bodies and agencies for providing services 
and functions which cannot be tackled by the market, and 
appropriate financial circuits to support environmental 
programmes that go beyond stimulation and regulation of 
decentralised initiatives.  
 
In such a secured but moving context, economic 
instruments will allow to catch new opportunities of cost-
effective responses to environmental challenges, whereas a 
CAC approach base on uniform standards of emissions, 
technological forcing or discretionary permitting systems will 
generally be too rigid and badly informed to catch these 
opportunities, and will impose unnecessarily high 
implementation costs. 
 
Although economic efficiency should be a common 
concern of all stakeholders, it is unevenly the case in real-life 
situations. It is a rather recent evolution to see such a concern 
enter the field of environmental decision-making, for instance 
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in Europe. So a strategy needs to be thought of in order to 
establish a link between envisaged economic instruments such 
as charges, product ecotaxes or tradable permits, with the main 
problems of concern for stakeholders taking part to the policy 
process related to environmental matters. To be adopted, 
economic instruments need to be seen as bringing practical 
solutions to problems that various interest groups want to solve 
or get rid of. Aside issues related to growth, income and 
employment, such stakes touch territorial decentralisation, 
privatisation, deficiencies of the rule of the law and corruption, 
relationships with the European Union and foreign investment, 
and the cleaning up of inherited pollution. 
 
Increasing the cost-effectiveness of environmental 
policies is a key challenge as well for OECD countries as for 
economies in transition. If the idea of sustainable development 
is to be taken seriously, this concern for efficiency and 
integration of environmental issues in various economic sectors 
should receive a growing importance in the future, at least for 
keeping the long run acceptance of this orientation by all 
populations. 
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